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Abstract Recently, XACML is a popular access control policy language that is
used widely in many applications. Policies in XACML are built based on many
components over distributed resources. Due to the expressiveness of XACML,
it is not trivial for policy administrators to understand the overall effect and
consequences of XACML policies they have written. In this paper we show a
mechanism and a tool how to analyses big access control policies sets such
as (i) incompleteness policies, (ii) conflicting policies, and (iii) unreachable
policies. To detect these problems we present a method using Answer Set
Programming (ASP) in the context of XACML 3.0.
Keywords: XACML, access control policies, policy language, Answer Set Pro-
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1 Introduction
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is an OASIS1 standard that
describes both a policy language and a query/response language for access con-
trol policies. It has been used in many different applications range over health
care information systems, transport systems to banking information systems2. The
policy language is used to express access control requirements (who can access what
when) over distributed resources and the query/response language is used to query
whether a particular access should be allowed (request) and to answer the query
(response). Access control policies in XACML are built based on many components
and combined using a particular combining algorithm.
Due to the expressiveness of XACML, it is not trivial for policy administrators to
understand the overall effect and consequences of XACML policies they have writ-
ten. The problem becomes more prevalent if there are no mechanisms/automated
1 OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standard)
is a non-for-profit, global consortium that drives the development, convergence,
and adoption of e-business standards. Information about OASIS can be found at
http://http://www.oasis-open.org/.
2 XACML references and products can be seen in https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/42588/xacmlRefs-V1-85.html.
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tools to analyse big chunk of policies. Several problems might occur in developing
access control policies such as incomplete policies and conflicting policies. Moreover,
detecting unreachable policies might help policy administrators to remove unused
policies in order to make the set of policies slimmer and make it easier to be main-
tained.
Analysing Incomplete Policies. It is high probable that policy developers do not define
all possible situations that might occur. Incomplete access control policies might
lead to a security problem. Following we present a probable scenario how an in-
truder can use this security hole to get an access.
In XACML, PDP (Policy Decision Point) computes a decision based on adminis-
trated policies in a database, but the final decision is made by PEP (Policy Enforce-
ment Point). There are two PEP-biased:
1. Permit-biased PEP: if the decision from PDP is deny, then the PEP shall deny
assess. All other decisions shall result in the permission of access.
2. Deny-biased PEP: if the decision from PDP is permit, then the PEP shall permit
the access. All other decisions shall result in the denial of access.
In this case, there is a possibility that an intruder can get an access unintentionally
by trying to query so that the response is no policy is applicable. Using Permit-biased
PEP, the decision will let the intruder have access to the system.
Analysing Conflicting Policies. Conflicting policies can have serious consequences
and may lead to unauthorized access. Basically, in XACML, conflicting decision
never occurs since all policies are combined with a particular combining algorithm
that only returns one decision. However it is interesting to analyse conflict in between
policies for example different department can have different decision. By analysing
conflict, the policy makers can rethink again whether they made correct policies.
Analysing Unreachable Policies. Analysisng unreachable policies helps policy admin-
istrators to reduce the size of the set of policies. A policy is unreachable if for all
request it never gives decision i.e., either it always not applicable or there is another
policy that overrides its decision. It is safe to remove unreachable policies because
their decisions never influence the final decisions.
To address the above concern we propose a logic-based XACML analysis frame-
work using logic programs (LPs) and answer set semantics. Answer Set Program-
ming (ASP) has become a popular approach to solve combinatorial problems de-
claratively. There are several efficient implementations of answer set solvers, such
as ASSAT3, clasp4, Cmodels5 , Smodels6, and many more. We present in this paper
a method using ASP to solve those problems explained previously in the context of
XACML 3.0 [5], the most recent version of XACML.
3 http://assat.cs.ust.hk/,
4 http://www.cs.uni-potsdam.de/clasp/
5 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cmodels/
6 http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/
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Outline. In this paper first we explain the model and semantics of XACML 3.0 in
Sect. 2. Then we describe the mapping of XACML 3.0 components into logic pro-
grams PXACM L in Sect. 3. Next we show how to analyse access control policies such
as incompleteness, conflicting and reachability XACML policies in Sect. 4. We end
the paper with conclusion and future work.
2 XACML Model and Semantics
In this section we briefly describe the XACML policy language and XACML query
language model. First we show the faithfully abstract syntax XACML 3.0. Then we
present a semantics of XACML 3.0 without considering indeterminate values. Our
argument is that we evaluate access control properties to a set of policies in stat-
ically. Hence, indeterminate values which only occur when there are errors during
evaluation process do not give impact to our analysis. At the end of this section we
show the semantics of XACML combining algorithms which are used for composing
several access control policies.
2.1 Abstract Syntax of XACML 3.0
We summarize the syntax of XACML 3.0 in Table 1. To make the notation clear
we use bold font for non-terminal symbols, typewriter font for terminal symbols
and identifiers and values are written in italic font. Moreover, <XACML Component>
denotes the symbol for XACML component. We use the star symbol (*) to indicate
that there is zero or more of the preceding element and we use the plus symbol (+)
to indicate that there is one or more of the preceding element. We assume that each
policy must have a unique identifier (ID).
Table 1. Abstraction of XACML 3.0 Components
XACML Policy Components
<PolicySet> :- PolicySetID = [<Target>,<< PolicySetID* >>, CombID ]
| PolicySetID = [<Target>, << PolicyID* >>, CombID ]
<Policy> :- PolicyID = [<Target>, << PolicySetID+ >> CombID ]
<Rule> :- RuleID = [ Effect, <Target> , <Condition> ]
<Condition> :- propositional formulae
<Target> :- Null
|
∧
<AnyOf> +
<AnyOf> :-
∨
<AllOf> +
<AllOf> :-
∧
<Match> +
<Match> :- AttrType( attribute value )
CombID :- po | do | fa | ooa
Effect :- deny | permit
AttrType :- subject | action | resource | environment
XACML Request Component
<Request> :- { Attribute+}
Attribute :- AttrType( attribute value ) | external state
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There are three levels of policies in XACML, namely <PolicySet>, <Policy>
and <Rule>. <PolicySet> or <Policy> can act as the root of a set of access control
policies while <Rule> is a single entity that describes one particular access control
policy. Through this paper, we assume that <PolicySet> is the root of the set of
access control policies.
<PolicySet> and <Policy> have the same characteristic, i.e., they are contain-
ers for a sequence of <PolicySet>, <Policy> or <Rule>. A <PolicySet> contains
either a sequence of <PolicySet> or a sequence of <Policy> while a <Policy>
only can contains a sequence of <Rule>. The sequence of <PolicySet>, <Policy>
or <Rule> is combined with a particular combining algorithm. There are four com-
mon combining algorithms defined in XACML 3.0, namely permit-overrides (po),
deny-overrides (do), first-applicable (fa) and only-one-applicable (ooa).
A <Rule> describes an individual access control policy. It regulates whether
an access should be permitted or denied. All <PolicySet>, <Policy> and <Rule>
are applicable whenever their <Target> matches with the <Request>. When the
<Rule>’s <Target>matches with the <Request>, then the applicability of the <Rule>
is refined by its <Condition>.
A <Target> is a combination of <Match> elements. Each <Match> element de-
scribes an attribute that a <Request> should match in order to activate a policy.
There are four attribute categories in XACML 3.0, namely subject attribute, action
attribute, resource attribute and environment attribute. The subject attribute is the
entity requesting access, e.g., a file system, a workstation, etc. The action attribute
defines the type of access requested, e.g., to read, to write, to delete, etc. The re-
source attribute is a data, service or system components. The environment attribute
can optionally provide additional information.
A <Request> contains a set of attributes information about access request. A
<Request> can contain additional information such as external state condition (e.g.
the current time, current temperature, etc).
2.2 XACML 3.0 Formal Semantics
The evaluation of XACML policies against a given request starts from the evaluation
of <Match> elements and continued bottom-up until the evaluation of <PolicySet>
as the root element. We use the ¹.º notation to map XACML elements into their
values (see the summary in Tabel 2).
Table 2. XACML Components’ Values
XACML Components Values¹<Match>º, ¹<AllOf>º,¹<AnyOf>º, ¹<Target>º match (m) and not match (nm)¹<Condition>º true (t) and false (f)¹<Rule>º, ¹<Policy>º,¹<PolicySet>º permit (p), deny (d) and not applicable (na)
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Evaluation of <Match> into {m,nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<Match> M is as follows
¹Mº(Q) = ¨m if M ∈Q
nm if M 6∈Q
(1)
Evaluation of <AllOf> into {m,nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<AllOf> A=
∧n
i=1 Mi is as follows
¹Aº(Q) = ¨m if ∀i : ¹Miº= m
nm if ∃i : ¹Miº= nm (2)
where each Mi is a <Match> element.
Evaluation of <AnyOf> into {m,nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<AnyOf> E =
∨n
i=1
Ai is as follows
¹Eº(Q) = ¨m if ∃i : ¹Aiº= m
nm if ∀i : ¹Aiº= nm (3)
where each Ai is a <AllOf> element.
Evaluation of <Target> into {m,nm }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<Target> T =
∧n
i=1
Ei is as follows
¹Tº(Q) = ¨m if ∀i : ¹Eiº= m or T = Null
nm if ∃i : ¹Eiº= nm (4)
where each Ei is a <AnyOf> element. Empty <Target>, indicated by Null always
evaluated to m.
Evaluation of <Condition> into { t, f }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<Condition> C is as follows
¹Cº(Q) = eval(C ,Q) (5)
Note: The eval is an unspecified function that returns { t, f }.
Evaluation of <Rule> into { d,p,na }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<Rule> R= [e, T,C] as follows
¹Rº(Q) = ¨e if ¹Tº(Q) = m and ¹Cº(Q) = t
na if (¹Tº(Q) = m and ¹Cº(Q) = f) or¹Tº(Q) = nm (6)
where e ∈ { p,d }, T is a <Target> element and C is a <Condition> element.
Evaluation of <Policy> into { d,p,na }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation of
<Policy> P = [T,<< R1, . . . ,Rn >>,CombID] is as follows
¹Pº(Q) = ¨na if ¹Tº(Q) = nm or ∀i : ¹Riº(Q) = na⊕
CombID(R) otherwise
(7)
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where T is a <Target> element, and each Ri is a <Rule> element. We use R to
denote << ¹R1º(Q), . . . ,¹Rnº(Q)>>.
Note: The combining algorithm denoted by
⊕
CombID will be explained in Sect. 2.3.
Evaluation of <PolicySet> into { d,p,na }. Given a <Request> Q, the evaluation
of <PolicySet> PS = [T,<< P1, . . . , Pn >>,CombID] is as follows
¹PSº(Q) = ¨na if ¹Tº(Q) = nm or ∀i : ¹Piº(Q) = na⊕
CombID(P) otherwise
(8)
where T is a <Target> element and each Pi is a <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) ele-
ment. We use P to denote << ¹P1º(Q), . . . ,¹Pnº(Q)>>.
2.3 XACML Combining Algorithms
There are four common combining algorithms defined in XACML 3.0, namely permit-
overrides (po), deny-overrides (do), first-applicable (fa) and only-one-applicable
(ooa). The permit-overrides combining algorithm takes permit decision as the most
priority than deny decision while the deny-overrides combining algorithm takes
deny decision over permit. Likewise their names, the first-applicable combining al-
gorithm return the first <Rule> (or <Policy> or <PolicySet>) that is applicable
(either permit (p) or deny(d) value) and the only-one-applicable combining al-
gorithm return a decision whenever only one <Rule> (or <Policy> or <PolicySet>)
which is applicable, otherwise it returns not applicable (na).
Permit-Overrides The permit-overrides combining algorithm is intended for those
cases where a permit decision should have priority over a deny decision.
Let S =<< v1, v2, . . . , vn >> be a sequence of policy values. The permit-overrides
combining algorithm,
⊕
po, is defined as follows
⊕
po
(S) =

p if ∃i : vi = p
d if ∀i : vi 6= p and ∃ j : v j = d
na otherwise
(9)
Deny-Overrides The deny-overrides is the mirror of permit-overrides whereas the
deny decision has more priority over a permit decision.
Let S =<< v1, v2, . . . , vn >> be a sequence of policy values. The deny-overrides
combining algorithm,
⊕
do, is defined as follows
⊕
do
(S) =

d if ∃i : vi = d
p if ∀i : vi 6= d and ∃ j : v j = p
na otherwise
(10)
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First-Applicable The result of first-applicable algorithm is the first Rule, Policy or
PolicySet element in the sequence whose is applicable.
Let S =<< v1, v2, . . . , vn >> be a sequence of policy values. The first-applicable
combining algorithm,
⊕
fa, is defined as follows⊕
fa
(S) =
¨
vi if ∃i : vi 6= na and ∀ j : j < i⇒ v j = na
na if ∀i : vi = na
(11)
Only-One-Applicable The result of the only-one-applicable combining algorithm
ensures that one and only one policy is applicable. If no policy applies, then the
result is na, but if more than one policy is applicable, then the result is idt. When
exactly one policy is applicable, the result of the combining algorithm is the result
of evaluating the single applicable policy. Please note that we do not use idt in this
step. Hence, all of idt value is converted to na.
Let S =<< v1, v2, . . . , vn >> be a sequence of policy values. The only-one-applicable
combining algorithm,
⊕
ooa, is defined as follows
⊕
ooa
(S) =

vi if ∃i : vi 6= na and ∀ j : j 6= i⇒ v j = na
na if (∃i, j : i 6= j and vi 6= na and v j 6= na) or
if ∀i : vi = na
(12)
3 Mapping XACML into Logic Programs
First we explain the syntax of logic program (LP) in this section. Then we show the
transforming XACML 3.0 into LP. The semantics of LP is explained in the following
section when we use it for analysis purposes.
3.1 Syntax of Logic Programs
We start by introducing some notations and terminologies which we will use through
the paper. First-Order Language. We consider an alphabet consisting of (finite or
countably infinite) disjoint sets of variables, constants, function symbols, predicate
symbols, connectives {not,∧,←}, punctuation symbols { ”(”, ”, ”, ”)”, ”.” } and spe-
cial symbols { ⊤,⊥}. In this paper we will use upper case letters to denote variables
and lower case letters to denote constants, function and predicate symbols. Terms,
atoms, literals and formulae are defined as usual. The language given by an alpha-
bet consists of the set of all formulae constructed from the symbols occurring in the
alphabet.
Logic Programs. A rule is an expression of the form
A← B1 ∧ . . .∧ Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ . . .∧ not Bn. (13)
where A is either an atom or ⊥ and each Bi , 1≤ i ≤ n, is an atom or ⊤. ⊤ is a valid
formula. A is called the head and B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ not Bn is called
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body of the clause. We usually write B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ . . . ∧ not Bn simply
as B1, . . . ,Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn.
We refer the rule as a constraint when A is ⊥. One should observe that the body
of a rule must not be empty. A rule of the form A←⊤ is called a fact.
A logic program (LP) is a finite set of rules. ground(P) denotes the set of all
ground instances of the program P.
3.2 XACML Transformations
The transformation of XACML components is based on the semantics of each com-
ponent explained in Sect. 2.2. First we recall the syntax of each component then we
show how the transformation is.
<Request> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let Q =

A1, . . . ,An
	
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be
a <Request> component. The transformation of <Request>, Q, into LP PQ is as
follows
Ai ←⊤. 1≤ i ≤ n
<Match> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let M be a <Match> component. The
transformation of <Match> M into LP PM is as follows (see (1) for <Match> evalu-
ation)
val(M ,m) ← M .
val(M ,nm)← not M .
<AllOf> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let A=
∧n
i=1 Mi be an <AllOf> compon-
ent where each Mi is a <Match> component. The transformation of <AllOf> A into
LP PA is as follows (see (2) for <AllOf> evaluation)
val(A,m) ← val(M1,m), . . . ,val(Mn,m).
val(A,nm)← val(Mi ,nm). (1≤ i ≤ n)
<AnyOf> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let E =
∨n
i=1 Ai be an <AnyOf> compon-
ent where each Ai is an <AllOf> component. The transformation of <AnyOf> E into
LP PE is as follows (see (3) for <AnyOf> evaluation)
val(E,m) ← val(Ai ,m). (1≤ i ≤ n)
val(E,nm)← val(A1,nm), . . . ,val(An,nm).
<Target> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let T =
∧n
i=1 Ei be a <Target> com-
ponent where each Ei is an <AnyOf> component. The transformation of <Target>
T into LP PT is as follows (see (4) for <Target> evaluation)
val(T,m) ← val(E1,m), . . . ,val(En,m).
val(null,m)←⊤.
val(T,nm) ← val(Ei,nm). (1≤ i ≤ n)
<Condition> Transformation. XACML Syntax: We assume that the <Condition>
element is a boolean formula which the evaluation of <Condition> is based on eval
function. The transformation of <Condition> C into LP PC is as follows
val(C ,V )← eval(C ,V ).
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In our previous example of <Rule> r1, the <Condition> cond(r1) is patient.id(X)
/\ patient_record.id(X). The possibility of eval function is like following
Pcond(r1) :
val(cond(r1),V )← eval(cond(r1),V ).
eval(cond(r1), t)← patient_id(X ), patient_record_id(X ).
eval(cond(r1), f)← patient_id(X ), patient_record_id(Y ),X 6= Y.
The error(patient_id(X )) and error(patient_record_id(X )) indicate possible er-
rors might occur, e.g., the system could not connect to the database so that the
system does not know the ID of the patient.
<Rule> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let Rid = [E, T,C] be a <Rule> component
where E ∈ { p,d }, T is a <Target> and C is a <Condition>. The transformation of
<Rule> Rid into LP PRid is as follows (see (6) for <Rule> evaluation)
val(Rid , E) ← val(T,m),val(C , t).
val(Rid ,na)← val(T,m),val(C , f).
val(Rid ,na)← val(T,nm).
<Policy> Transformation. XACML Syntax: Let Pid = [T,<< R1, . . . ,Rn >>,CombID]
be a <Policy> component where T is a <Target>, < R1, . . . ,Rn > be a sequence
of <Rule> elements and CombID be a combining algorithm identifier. In order to
indicate that the <Policy> contains <Rule> Ri , thus for every <Rule> Ri contained
in Pid = [T,<< R1, . . . ,Rn >>,CombID], PPid also contains:
dec(Pid ,Ri , E)← val(Ri , E). (1≤ i ≤ n)
Next, we do a transformation for <Policy> Pid and add into LP PPid is as follows
(see (7) for <Policy> evaluation)
val(Pid ,na)← val(T,nm).
val(Pid ,na)← val(R1,na), . . . ,val(Rn,na).
val(Pid , E) ← val(T,m),dec(Pid ,R,V ),V 6= na,algo(CombID, Pid , E).
We write formulae dec(Pid ,R,V ),V 6= na to make sure that there is a <Rule> in
the <Policy> that is not evaluated to na. We do this to avoid a return value from
a combining algorithm that is not naeven tough all of the <Rule> elements are
evaluated to na.
<PolicySet> Transformation. The transformation of <PolicySet> is similar to the
transformation of <Policy> component.
XACML Syntax: Let PSid = [T,<< P1, . . . , Pn >>,CombID] be a <Policy> com-
ponent where T is a <Target>, < P1, . . . , Pn > be a sequence of <Policy> (or
<PolicySet>) elements and CombID be a combining algorithm identifier. The trans-
formation of <PolicySet> PSid into logic program PS Pid is as follows For every
<Policy> (or <PolicySet>) contained in PSid = [T,<< P1, . . . , Pn >>,CombID],
PPSid also contains:
dec(PSid , Pi , E)← val(Pi , E). (1≤ i ≤ n)
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And we following rules into PPSid
val(PSid ,na)← val(T,nm).
val(PSid ,na)← val(P1,na), . . . ,val(Pn,na).
val(PSid , E) ← val(T,m),dec(PSid , P,V ),V 6= na,algo(CombID, PSid , E).
3.3 Combining Algorithm Transformation
We use P for an variable of <Policy> identifier and R, R1 and R2 for variables
of <Rule> identifiers. In case the evaluation of <PolicySet>, the input P is for
<PolicySet> identifier, R,R1 and R2 are for <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) identifiers.
Permit-Overrides Transformation. Let Ppo be a LP obtained by permit-overrides
combining algorithm transformation (see (9) for the permit-overrides combining
algorithm semantics). Ppo contains:
algo(po, P,p) ← dec(P,R,p).
algo(po, P,d) ← not algo(po, P,p),dec(P,R,d).
algo(po, P,na)← not algo(po, P,p),not algo(po, P,d).
Deny-Overrides Transformation. Let P be a LP obtained by deny-overrides com-
bining algorithm transformation (see (10) for the permit-overrides combining al-
gorithm semantics). Ppo contains:
algo(po, P,d) ← dec(P,R,d).
algo(po, P,p) ← not algo(po, P,d),dec(P,R,p).
algo(po, P,na)← not algo(po, P,d),not algo(po, P,d).
First-Applicable Transformation. Let Pfa be a logic program obtained by first-
applicable combining algorithm transformation (see (11) for the first-applicable
combining algorithm semantics). For each <Policy> (or <PolicySet>) which uses
first-applicable combining algorithm, Pid = [T,<< R1, . . . ,Rn >>, fa], PPid contains:
algo(fa, P, E)← dec(P,R1, E), E 6= na.
algo(fa, P, E)← dec(P,R1,na),dec(P,R2, E), E 6= na.
...
algo(fa, P, E)← dec(P,R1,na), . . . ,dec(P,Rn−1,na),
dec(P,Rn, E).
Only-One-Applicable Transformation. Let Pooa be a logic program obtained by
only-one-applicable combining algorithm transformation (see (12) for the only-one-
applicable combining algorithm semantics). Pooa contains:
not_one_applicable(P)← dec(P,R1,X ),dec(P,R2,Y ),R1 6= R2,X 6= na,Y 6= na.
algo(ooa, P, E) ← dec(P,R, E),not not_one_applicable(P).
algo(ooa, P,na) ← not_one_applicable(P).
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4 Policy Analysis
We use the semantics of LP PXACM L – the result from transforming XACML compon-
ents into series of LPs – to analyse access control policy properties. In this section,
we present three policy analysis cases namely analysing on incompleteness policies,
conflicting policies and unreachable policies. The completeness and free of conflict
properties have been introduces by Samarati and di Vimercati in [7] and formal-
ized using Belnap four-valued logic [2] by Bruns and Huth in [3]. In this section
we show how we present ASP programs to capture those properties7. Our intention
is to have an automatic tool that shows XACML formalization and in the same time
it can be used to help policy administrators to analyse their policies sets.
4.1 Semantics of Logic Programs
The declarative semantics of a logic program is given by a model-theoretic semantics
of formulae in the underlying language. The formal definition of answer set se-
mantics can be found in many literatures like in [1,4].
Interpretations and Models The Herbrand Universe UL for a language L is the
set of all ground terms that can be formed from the constants and function symbols
appearing in L. The Herbrand base BL for a language L is the set of all ground atoms
that can be formed by using predicate symbols from L and ground terms from UL
as arguments. By BP we denote the Herbrand base for language underlying the
program P. When the context is clear, we are safe to omit P.
An interpretation I of a program P is a mapping from the Herbrand base BP to
the set of truth value true and false ({ ⊤,⊥}). All atoms belong to interpretation I
are mapped to ⊤. All atoms which does not occur in I are mapped to ⊥.
The truth value of arbitrary formulae under some interpretation can be determ-
ined from a truth table as usual (see Table 3).
Table 3. Truth Values for Formulae
φ ψ not φ φ ∧ψ φ←ψ
⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊤ ⊤
⊤ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊤
⊥ ⊤ ⊤ ⊥ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊤ ⊥ ⊤
The logical value of ground formulae can be derived from Table 3 in the usual
way. A formula φ is then true under interpretation I , denoted by I(φ) = ⊤, if all its
ground instances are true in I ; it is false under interpretation I , denoted by I(φ) =⊥,
if there is a ground instance of φ that is false in I .
Let I be an interpretation. I satisfies formula φ, denoted by I |= φ, if I(φ) =⊤.
For a program P, we say I satisfies of P, denoted by I |= P, if I satisfies for every
clause in P.
7 We call ASP programs for logic programs with answer set semantics.
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Let I be a collection of interpretations. Then an interpretation I is I is called
minimal in I if and only if there is no interpretation J in I such that J ( I . An
interpretation I is called least in I if and only if I ⊆ J for any interpretation J in
I. A model M of a program P is called minimal (respectively least) if it is minimal
(respectively least) among all models of P.
The answer set semantics of logic program P assigns to P a collection of answer
sets – interpretations of ground(P). An interpretation I of ground(P) is an answer
set for P if I is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among the interpretations satisfying
the rules of
P I = {A← B1, . . . ,Bm| A← B1, . . . ,Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn ∈ P and
I(not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn) = true}
A logic program can have a unique, many or none answer set(s). Therefore, we
show that programs with a particular characteristic are guaranteed to have unique
answer set.
Acyclic Programs. We say that a program is acyclic when there is no cycle in the
program.The acyclicity in the program is guaranteed by the existence of a certain
fixed assignment of natural numbers to atoms that is called a level mapping.
A level mapping for a program P is a function
l : BP → N
where N is the set of natural numbers and BP is the Herbrand base for P. We
extend the definition of level mapping to a mapping from ground literals to natural
numbers by setting l(not A) = l(A).
Let P be a logic program and l be a level mapping for P. P is acyclic with respect
to l if for every clause A← B1, . . . ,Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn in ground(P) we find
l(A) > l(Bi) for all i with 1≤ i ≤ n
P is acyclic if it is acyclic with respect to some level mapping.
Acyclic programs are guaranteed to have unique answer sets [1].
4.2 XACML Semantics Based On ASP Semantics
We can see from Sect. 3 that all of the XACML 3.0 transformation programs are
acyclic. Thus, it is guaranteed that PXACM L has unique answer set.
Proposition 1. Let PXACM L be a program obtained from XACML 3.0 element trans-
formations and let PQ be a program transformation of <Request> Q. Let I be the
answer set of PXACM L ∪PQ. Then the following equation holds
¹Xº(Q) = V iff val(X ,V ) ∈ I
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4.3 Analysis on Incompleteness Policies
A set of policies is complete if it always returns a decision given for any request.
XACML defines that there is one <PolicySet> as the root of a set of policies. There-
fore, we formally express completeness property as follows:
complete: ∀Q : ¹PSrootº(Q) 6= na
where Q for <Request> and PSroot is the root of <PolicySet> element in the set of
policies.
We say that there is a gap in the policy set if it is not complete. Hence, we
formally express gap property as follows:
gap: ¬complete
It is equal to
gap: ∃Q : ¹PSrootº(Q) = na
The idea of having gap property is to have a logic program that can show answer
sets whenever there is gap in the policies. We use the answer sets as the witnesses
of the incompleteness policies.
In order to check gap property we should generate all possible values restored
in the database for each attribute. Each attribute only possible to have one value.
Thus, we use cardinality constraint [8,10] and the encoding is as follows:
Pgenerate_one :
1{sub ject(X ) : sub ject_d b(X )}1 ←⊤.
1{act ion(X ) : act ion_d b(X )}1 ←⊤.
1{resource(X ) : resource_d b(X )}1 ←⊤.
1{environment(X ) : environment_d b(X )}1←⊤.
The intuitive meaning of the above cardinality constrains is that, for each subject in
the database, exactly one instance of subject request is generated. The conversion
holds for other attributes.
We say there is a gap whenever we can find a request that makes value of the
PSroot is na. Here is the encoding:
Pgap :
gap ← val(PSroot ,na).
⊥ ← not gap.
We force ASP solver to find a gap by putting a constraint ⊥← not gap.
The answer sets of program P = PXACM L ∪Pgenerate_one ∪Pgap are the witnesses
that the set of policies encoded in PXACM L is incomplete. When there is no model
satisfies the program then we are sure that the set of policies captures all of possible
cases.
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4.4 Analysis on Conflicting Policies
A conflict never occurs in XACML because the structure of policies where there
is only one <PolicySet> as the root of all of policies and all of others policies
are combined by combining algorithm. Each combining algorithm returns a single
decision either permit or deny and never return both decisions in the same time.
However, it is still interesting to know whether there are two <Rule> give conflict
decisions. We formally define a conflict is as follows:
conflict: ∃Q : ¹Rº(Q) = p∧¹R′º(Q) = d
In order to compute whether there is a conflict in the set of policies, we encode a
logic program for conflict property as follows:
Pconflict :
conflict ← val(R,p),val(R′,d),R 6= R′.
⊥ ← not conflict.
The same as gap condition, we force ASP solver to find a conflict by putting a
constraint ⊥← not conflict.
A conflict can be analysis whenever P = PXACM L ∪Pgenerate_one ∪Pconflict returns
answer sets. The returning models are evidences where the conflict between <Rule>
occurs. We conclude that a set of policies is conflict-free if and only if program P is
unsatisfied, i.e., there is no returned model.
4.5 Analysis on Reachability Policies
A policy is reachable if there is a request such that the decision is made based on
this policy. Usually in a big set of policies, there is a policy that is not reachable.
This happens because policies are built based on several components and combined
together. We formally define a reachability property as follows:
reachable(R): ∃Q : ¹Rº(Q) 6= na.
where Q is <Request> element and R is <Rule> element.
The encoding of reachability property in logic program is as follows:
Preachable :
reachable(R)← val(R, E), E 6= na.
Formally, a policy is not reachable if for every request either:
1. It always return na.
unreachable(R): ∀Q : ¹Rº= na
2. in case of permit-overrides combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if its
decision is deny but the final decision of the root policy is permit.
unreachable: ∀Q : ¹Rº= d∧¹Pº(Q) = p
where in P = [T,<< . . . ,R, . . . >>,po]
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3. In case of deny-overrides combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if its
decision is permit but the final decision of the root policy is deny.
unreachable(R): ∀Q : ¹Rº= p∧¹Pº(Q) = d
where in P = [T,<< . . . ,R, . . . >>,do]
4. In case of only-one-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if
it is applicable policy but the final decision of the root policy is not applicable.
This indicates that there is another policy that is also applicable.
unreachable(R): ∀Q : ¹Rº 6= na∧¹Pº(Q) = na
where in P = [T,<< . . . ,R, . . . >>,ooa]
5. In case of first-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is not reachable if it is
applicable but there is another policy in the same collection that is in the earlier
of the sequence that is also applicable.
unreachable(R j): ∀Q : ¹R jº 6= na∧¹Riº(Q) 6= na∧ i < j
where in P = [T,<< . . . ,Ri , . . . ,R j , . . . >>, fa]
First of all we should generate all possible attributes. This time, the encoding
is different with program Pgenerate_one because we want to generate all possible at-
tributes, not only one. Hence, we do not use cardinality constraint in this encoding.
Here is the encoding:
Pgenerate_all :
sub ject(X ) ← sub ject_d b(X ).
act ion(X ) ← act ion_d b(X ).
resource(X ) ← resource_d b(X ).
environment(X )← environment_d b(X ).
Following we translate each unreachable condition into logic program
Pnot_reachable :
not_reachable(R)← not reachable(R).
not_reachable(R)← val(P,p),dec(P,R,d).
not_reachable(R)← val(P,d),dec(P,R,p).
not_reachable(R)← val(P,na),dec(P,R, E), E 6= na.
In the case of first-applicable combining algorithm, there is a possibility a policy
returns permit and the final decision is also permit, but, the permit of the final
decision comes from the earlier applicable policy. Hence, we should take care of
the ordering of policies. We need to add extra rules in the program transformations
such as: for every <Rule> Ri contained in Pid = [T,<< R1, . . . ,Rn >>, fa], PPid also
contains:
dec(Pid ,Ri , E, I)← val(Ri , E). (1≤ i ≤ n)
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Here we add to our Pnot_reachable
not_reachable(R j)← dec(Pid ,Ri , E, I),dec(Pid ,R j , E′, J), E 6= na, E′ 6= na, I < J .
To check unreachable property we add to our program Pnot_reachable :
not_reachable← not_reachable(R).
⊥ ← not not_reachable.
We force ASP solver to find unreachable policies by putting a constraint ⊥ ←
not not_reachable. When not_reachable(R) is in the answer set of P = PXACM L ∪
Pgenerate_all ∪Preachable ∪Pnot_reachable then it is safe to remove policy R from the set
because it is unreachable.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have shown a mechanism to map XACML 3.0 components into logic programs.
Using the advantages of ASP technique to solve combinatorial problems efficiently
we have presented ASP programs to capture analysing in access control policies
incompleteness property, conflicting property and unreachability property. Our in-
tention is to have an automatic tool that both showing formalization and also help
policy administrators to analyse their policies sets.
For future work, we would like to analyse conflict in attribute based like in
Singh’s work [9]. We also would like to extend our work to handle Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) [6] and see the conflict might occurs between different
roles.
In order to reduce the policies, we could inspect redundancy between policies.
We should find a subset of policies that might capture the whole possible decisions
might happen in all policies. Thus, we could have smaller set than the original
policies set.
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